ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

The text of The Islamic Declaration was drafted in Sarajevo in 1969, in then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) In 1970, the author “edited it finally and sent it into the world”. Although copies of the writing were made for over a decade, both in the SFRY and in diaspora, it would come into focus of local public only in 983, when Izetbegović's writing was one of the key counts of the charges at the so-called Sarajevo process against a group of Muslim intellectuals, when Izetbegović was sentenced to fourteen years of prison, where he stayed until 1988, for a “crime of association for the purpose of hostile activity and counter-revolutionary threat to social order”.

The period that followed is more or less known. After the Serbian aggression on BiH and genocide over Bosniaks (1992–1995), The Islamic Declaration was again used as evidence in court proceedings, this time as a material by means of which the accused and their witnesses attempted to “give meaning” to the genocide over Bosniaks and destroying Islamic cultural heritage. Despite rhetorical disguise, the syllogism is fairly simple. According to one premise, Izetbegović is an Islamic fundamentalist since his Islamic Declaration is a fundamentalist reading. According to another, since Bosniaks accepted Izetbegović as their political leader, they are fundamentalist as well. The aggression on BiH and the genocide are a conclusion.

The Islamic Declaration is the agitational platform, an ideological document, a program aimed at “Islamization of Muslims”. The author admits the eclectic character of the declaration already in the introduction, underscoring that it “does not present ideas which could be considered quite new”. Which ideas does Izetbegović have in mind? Obviously, the rich repertoire of reforming and restorative tradition.

Although reformism covers a fairly broad semantic space, it seems to us that Izetbegović synthesizes concepts of the key figures of this heritage, above all those of religious reformism and political modernism, following Afgan–Mawdudi–Qutb, and in many points coinciding with the discourse of the movement “Muslim Brotherhood” (al-Iĥwān al-Muslimūn). The Islamic Declaration is a distinctive cross-section of all these lines and, as such, Izetbegović's contribution to the global discussion of Muslim intelligentsia of the issues of Muslim. These issues were decisively determined by the colonial context, Muslim subordination and civilizational decadence, and by laicist erasing of Islamic symbols in the hearts of the already humiliated and defeated Muslim countries, cities and institutions. As Izetbegović himself wrote in his book Sjećanja (Memories): it is addressed to Muslims of the world, not to Muslims of Yugoslavia.

The Declaration is composed of three short parts. The first part starts from the cardinal statement of Muslim decadence (Izetbegović uses terms such as: backwardness, impotence, indifference and, somewhat less frequently, debauchery, filth, injustice and cowardice), and turns, without too much resentment characteristic of other reformist authors, turns to the analysis of historical, political and theological causes of the decadence, and to plans for exiting the established reality. The state of Muslim subordination, having in mind all the privileges which the Muslim world has, is an “abnormal state” according to Izetbegović. Backwardness is an indicator that Islamic principles, included in the spirit of the Revelation, have been misappropriated. The Islamic Declaration laconically reduces the key participants in this treason or deviation and, as such, crucial obstacles to Islamic revival, to two extremely polysemic concepts: conservatives and modernists. Izetbegović defines the term „conservatives in more detail and begins to severely criticize the “class of hadjis and sheikhs” as “the main holders of conservative understanding in the Muslim world”. It is followed by a shrewd assessment that “contrary to clear views of the non-existence of clergy in Islam”, hadjis and sheikhs still “organized themselves as a separate class which monopolized interpretation of Islam and made themselves mediators between the Qur'an and people.” Although it easily criticize the existence of a “separate class”, The Islamic Declaration does not provide an answer or offer a plan, not even broad hints, as to how to organize religious life which would be in line with “clear views of the non-existence of clergy in Islam”. For example, how to organize jamaat activities; who will, in simple terms, take the burden of religious routine when the storm of the revolution calms down? However, according to Izetbegović, ulama turned religion into a profession, “very comfortable and profitable”, and they are a layer of Muslim society which, ultimately, does not want changes. They are living well. That is why they are “wrong people at a wrong place”. The text clearly reveals that it is a universal problem of Muslim history and Muslim world where it, more or less, follows the “Muslim Brotherhood“ and their, primarily Kutb's, critique of the traditional ulama. Ulama is part of the system and as such the opposing Ihvani paradigm will never trust it.

On the other hand, Izetbegović understands “modernist”“ as well-educated Muslims of laicist and nationalistic orientation which uncritically accept Western values. They are the “true misfortune” of the Muslim world. Their reforms are methodologically wrong since they mercilessly tear the cultural, historical and spiritual roots of their own tradition, establishing an unnatural discontinuity which then, as an unstoppable fissure, spreads across the Muslim social reality. It ultimately culminates in a gap between intelligentsia and people since “Muslim peoples will never accept anything which is explicitly opposed to Islam”. Thus, the goal is creating an intelligentsia which will resemble its people, which will think and feel in the Islamic way.

The second part defines ideological bases of Islamic revival, the ultimate goal of which is establishment of Islamic order. Izetbegović, as we can see, does not use the word 'state' but a fairly broader term, 'order' to underscore the synthetic, organic character of Islam. That Izetbegović's vision of Islamic order is pure Utopia is indicated by the description of the order as a state where most conflicts which existed in Muslim societies will be terminated. Islam is a historical and meta-historical religion at the same time. Izetbegović deals with its historicity. His “theology” is wordly, pragmatic.

The Islamic Declaration presents revolutionary thinking which, above all, must be confident, and then specific and unambiguous. Many things within it go without saying, and many ideas are presented in a too resolute tone. The writer of The Islamic Declaration moves in the ideal space of principles all the time and often ignores the unpredictability, confusion and arrogance of reality. He reconstructs and reaffirms fundamental Islamic principles as they were provided in the Revelation: belief in God, natural morality, responsibility, social justice, order, peace, learnedness, openness toward the world. For this reason, The Islamic Declaration abounds with categorial claims which openly challenge facts. At the time when he wrote The Islamic Declaration each of these fundamental principles was threatened. Muslims were no longer Muslims. Faced with this horrible reality, due to the fear of termination of fundamental principles, everything else loses primacy. Izetbegović does not deal with purification of the basics, he considers the basics sufficiently self-explanatory and simple. One should only live them and carry them out.

In the last part Izetbegović deals with practical strategies for the implementation of Islamic order and establishing Islamic rule. This road leads strictly from religious and moral toward political revolution, since one is faulty without the other. Religious and moral revival id the true meaning of the phrase “Islamization of Muslims”. Consequently, the aim of the declaration is not founding a political party but rather a movement, since only a movement “includes ethical criteria” and “morally engages people”ˮ.

Izetbegović advocates a revival of Muslim world which proceeds through work, sacrifice and effort. He goes on to elaborate on the idea of pan-Islamism in Afghani's style. According to Izetbegović, pan-Islamism, understood as the “creation of certain supra-national structures” is a natural function of Islamic order. On the other hand, pan-Islamism as a concept has never been too popular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Islamic Declaration is an exception, an incident in this respect.

If this is the case, what is the context in which Izetbegović writes The Islamic Declaration, where he so bravely advocates a union of Muslim countries? To understand it it is necessary to take into account both the tensions and geopolitical changes at the time, and the involvement of then communist Yugoslav establishment in the Non-aligned Movement. Yugoslav leadership wanted to have good relations with Muslim countries which, as is well-known, made up a significant part of member-states. Political clasps directed to the Muslim community began to loosen, the “controlled liberalization” set in, and many Muslim intellectuals, including a certain number of theologians, benefited from the new situation. In our opinion, this context is crucial for understanding both the motivation behind the text and the courage and naivete of it. The multilayered and hard circumstances in which “programs” such as The Islamic Declaration emerged are now typically ignored. However, like any other text, this declaration is also inherently historical. Izetbegović is a besieged thinker.