THE EASTERN QUESTION

The history of Muslims in the Balkans in the 20th century, after the Ottoman State had withdrawn from this territory, proceeded in the sign of migrations, a minority status within the newly established Balkan Christian states, hidden or open discrimination, persecution or genocidal wars. Periods of relative peace were only an introduction to new, more violent suffering. When one looks for a paradigm – a reference frame in which these events can be summarized and understood – there are enough reasons to opt for the Eastern Question. The choice seems unusual, particularly when one keeps in mind the fact that the Eastern Question, regardless of its definition, is typically placed in the timeframe between 1774 (Kuchuk, Kainarji Treaty) and 1923 (Treaty of Lausanne).  However, the destiny of Balkan Muslims after 1923 justifies the use of the Eastern Question as a paradigm and for interpreting the history of Muslims until the end of the 20th century. Papers and many other studies, documents and testimonies speak of the survival of the mentality of the Eastern Question among Balkan Christian national elites, which was revealed in depicting Islam as a foreign religion on the European soil, in their reference frame and vocabulary related to Muslims and search for allies from the time of wars for the Ottoman heritage.

 A brief overview of the treatment of the Eastern Question by selected European authors leads to the conclusion that this paradigm pertains to filling the political vacuum created by the fall and gradual disintegration of the Ottoman State, and to solving the issue of the Ottoman heritage. In terms of the territory, the Eastern Question pertained to events in a broad geographic area from Bosnia to the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and from the Arabian Peninsula to Algeria. In the inner dynamics of solving the Eastern Question, a large part of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century pertained to the Balkans.

The political vacuum created by the Ottoman loss of Balkan territories was resolved by renewing or forming a multitude of Balkan national Christian states. Once united geographic region of Rumelia or Ottoman Europe (Awrupa-i Osmani) was divided into a multitude of small, mutually distrustful and conflicting states.

One of the main features of the formation of Balkan national states was the definition of a nation according to the religion criterium and understanding of a state as a political tool in the hands of a nation defined in this way. In such circumstances, little living space was left for “others”, particularly for Muslims. During historical resolving of the Eastern Question in the Balkans, Balkan national states identified, in smaller or greater nuances, Muslim population with the Ottoman state structures or considered it successors of the Ottomans. Consequently, the formation of each Balkan Christian national state was accompanied by mass pogroms of Muslims, persecutions, changes in the appearance and names of settlements, files of refugees who moved along muddy roads or impassable mountain passes, dreams of returning home, or unfulfilled contracts about indemnification for seized or left assets. This picture can be reconstructed when one reads any of the documents about Belgrade in 1807, Morea in 1821, Užice in 1862, Sofia in 1877, Strumica, Kukes, Serez and Dedeagac in 1912–1913, the Lim Valley in 1943, Bulgarian-Turkish border in 1989, Višegrad and Foča in 1992, Srebrenica and Žepa in 1995 or Peć in 1999. 

Behind the frequently repeated claim that halting of the “Muslim threat” in the Balkans actually defends Europe one reveals the mentality of the Eastern Question, which identifies Europe with the Pax Christiana (Christian world). In the Ottoman age, the presence of Islam in Europe was restricted to the Balkans, i.e. to the southeast part of the European continent. All encounters between the two civilizations, even conflicts, took place in these regions. However, in the second half of the 20th century Western Europe opened the door to numerous Muslim students, workers and immigrants who eventually formed relatively stable and dynamic communities.

Even a cursory glance at the theoretical framework and vocabulary of the political and intellectual discourse of the leaders of Balkan national states speaks of the survival of the mentality of the Eastern Question. In the intellectual discourse, intellectuals of Balkan Christian groups have typically not been able to provide an objective, critical history of their countries or regions under the Ottoman administration. Their works follow the national-romanticist approach and speak of the “Turkish yoke”, “life beyond history”, “breakups of the ties to Europe” etc. For an integral and objective insight into the history of Islam in the Balkans, a European reader must consult Western European and, particularly, American authors. The political discourse typically refers to Slavic Muslims as “converts to Islam - turncoats (poturice)”, “renegades” and to the struggle for their nationalization. The reference frame and vocabulary of Serbian ideologists, politicians and intellectuals of the 1990s, when they initiated wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, is particularly illustrative. This reference frame consists of the ideas of the revenge for the defeat at Kosovo in 1389, continuation of Serbian rebellion in 1804, or of the Balkan War in 1912.

This short analysis shows that the Eastern Question paradigm can be used for understanding the mentality of Balkan Christian nationalistic leaders and explaining their treatment of Muslim population. Their nationalism is basically the nationalism of the 19thcentury and it should be interpreted by paradigms of that time. In a sense, the same paradigm can also be used for interpreting the behavior of other participants in the events in the Balkans, particularly those that played a role in resolving the classical Eastern Question of 1774–1923 and became hostages of (un)true historical parallels.